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Abstract
This article presents a summary of a keynote lecture at the Deep Learn-
ing Security workshop at IEEE Security and Privacy 2018. This lecture
summarizes the state of the art in defenses against adversarial examples
and provides recommendations for future research directions on this topic.
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I.I.D. Machine Learning
Train Test I: Independent 
I: Identically 
D: Distributed 
All train and test examples 
drawn independently from 
same distribution 
Figure 1: Traditionally, most machine learning work has taken place in the
context of the I.I.D. assumptions.
“I.I.D.” stands for “independent and identically distributed”. It means that all
of the examples in the training and test set are generated independently from
each other, and are all drawn from the same data-generating distribution.
This diagram illustrates this with an example training set and test set sampled
for a classification problem with 2 input features (one plotted on horizontal axis,
one plotted on vertical axis) and 2 classes (orange plus versus blue X).
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ML reached “human-level performance” 
on many IID tasks circa 2013
...solving CAPTCHAS and 
reading addresses...
...recognizing objects 
and faces….
(Szegedy et al, 2014)
(Goodfellow et al, 2013)
(Taigmen et al, 2013)
(Goodfellow et al, 2013)
Figure 2: Until recently, machine learning was difficult, even in the I.I.D. setting.
Adversarial examples were not interesting to most researchers because mistakes
were the rule, not the exception.
In about 2013, machine learning started to reach human-level performance on
several benchmark tasks (here I highlight vision tasks because they have nice
pictures to put on a slide). These benchmarks are not particularly well-suited
for comparing to humans, but they do show that machine learning has become
quite advanced and impressive in the I.I.D. setting.
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Caveats to “human-level” benchmarks
Humans are not very good 
at some parts of the 
benchmark
The test data is not very 
diverse. ML models are fooled 
by natural but unusual data.
Figure 3: When we say that a machine learning model has reached human-level
performance for a benchmark, it is important to keep in mind that benchmarks
may not be able to capture performance on these tasks realistically.
For example, humans are not necessarily very good at recognizing all of the
obscure classes in ImageNet, such as this dhole (one of the 1000 ImageNet
classes). Image from the Wikipedia article “dhole”.
Just because the data is I.I.D. does not necessarily mean it captures the same
distribution the model will face when it is deployed. For example, datasets tend
to be somewhat curated, with relatively cleanly presented canonical examples.
Users taking photos with phones take unusual pictures. Here is a picture I took
with my phone of an apple in a mesh bag. A state of the art vision model tags
this with only one tag: “material”. My family wasn’t sure it was an apple, but
they could tell it was fruit and apple was their top guess. If the image is blurred
the model successfully recognizes it as “still life photography” so the model is
capable of processing this general kind of data; the bag is just too distracting.
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Security Requires Moving 
Beyond I.I.D.
• Not identical: attackers can use unusual inputs 
• Not independent: attacker can repeatedly send a single mistake (“test 
set attack”)
(Eykholt et al, 2017)
Figure 4: When we want to provide security guarantees for a machine learning
system, we can no longer rely on the I.I.D. assumptions.
In this presentation, I focus on attacks based on modifications of the input
at test time. In this context, the two main relevant violations of the I.I.D.
assumptions are:
The test data is not drawn from the same distribution as the training data. The
attacker intentionally shifts the distribution at test time toward unusual inputs
such as this adversarial stop sign ( https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.08945 ) that will
be processed incorrectly.
The test examples are not necessarily drawn independently from each other. A
real attacker can search for a single input that causes a mistake, and then send
that input repeatedly, every time they interact with the system.
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Good models make surprising 
mistakes in non-IID setting
Schoolbus Perturbation 
(rescaled for visualization)
Ostrich
+ =
(Szegedy et al, 2013)
“Adversarial examples”
Figure 5: The deep learning community first started to pay attention to surpris-
ing mistakes in the non-IID setting when Christian Szegedy showed that even
imperceptible changes of IID test examples could result in consistent misclassi-
fication.
The paper ( https://arxiv.org/abs/1312.6199 ) introduced the term “adversarial
examples” to describe these images. They were formed by using gradient-based
optimization to perturb a naturally occurring image to maximize the probability
of a specific class.
The discovery of these gradient-based attacks against neural networks was con-
current work happening at roughly the same time as work done by Battista
Biggio et al ( https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-642-40994-
3 25 ). Biggio et al’s work was published earlier in 2013 while Christian’s paper
appeared on arxiv in late 2013. The first written record I personally have of
Christian’s work is a 2012 e-mail from Yoshua Bengio.
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Attacks on the machine 
learning pipeline
X ✓
x
yˆ
Training data
Learning algorithm
Learned parameters
Test input
Test output
Training set 
poisoning
Model theft
Adversarial Examples
Recovery of sensitive 
training data
Figure 6: To define adversarial examples more clearly, we should consider some
other security problems. Many machine learning algorithms can be described
as a pipeline that takes training data X, learns parameters theta, and then uses
those parameters to process test inputs x to produce test outputs y-hat.
Attacks based on modifying the training data to cause the model to learn in-
correct behaviors are called training set poisoning.
Attackers can study learned parameters theta to recover sensitive information
from the training set (for example, recovering social security numbers from a
trained language model as demonstrated by https://arxiv.org/abs/1802.08232
). Attackers can send test inputs x and observe outputs y-hat to reverse engineer
their model and train their own copy. This is known as a model theft attack.
Model theft can then enable further attacks, like recovery of private training
data or improved adversarial examples.
Adversarial examples are distinct from these other security concerns: they are
inputs supplied at test time, intended to cause the model to make a mistake.
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Definition
“Adversarial examples are inputs to 
machine learning models that an 
attacker has intentionally designed 
to cause the model to make a 
mistake”
(Goodfellow et al 2017)
Figure 7: There is no standard community-accepted definition of the term “ad-
versarial examples” and the usage has evolved over time.
I personally coined the term “adversarial examples” while helping to write Chris-
tian’s paper so I feel somewhat within my rights to push a definition.
The definition that I prefer today was introduced in an OpenAI blog post and
developed with my co-authors of that blog post.
There are three aspects of this definition I want to emphasize.
There is no need for the adversarial example to be made by applying a small or
imperceptible perturbation to a clean image. That was how we used the term
in the original paper, but its usage has evolved over time. In particular, the
picture of the apple in the mesh bag counts. I went out of my way to find a
strange context that would fool the model.
2) Adversarial examples are not defined in terms of deviation from human per-
ception, but in terms of deviation from some absolute standard of correct be-
havior. In contexts like visual object recognition, human labelers might be the
best approximation we have to the ground truth, but human perception is not
the definition of truth. Humans are subject to mistakes and optical illusions
too, and ideally we could make a machine learning system that is harder to fool
than a human.
3) An adversarial example is intended to be misclassified, but the attacker does
not necessarily succeed. This makes it possible to discuss “error rate on adver-
sarial examples”. If adversarial examples were defined to be actually misclassi-
fied, this error rate would always be 1 by definition.
For a longer discussion see https://arxiv.org/abs/1802.08195
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Define a game
• Define an action space for the defender 
• Define an action space for an attacker 
• Define cost function for defender 
• Define cost function for attacker 
• Not necessarily minimax. 
• Targeted vs untargeted
Figure 8: To study machine learning in the adversarial setting, we must define
a game, formally.
This means we must define an action space and cost function for both the
attacker and the defender.
Usually, the defender’s action space is to output a class ID, but we can also
imagine other variants of the game, where the defender can output a confidence
value or can refuse to classify adversarially manipulated inputs.
In the context of adversarial examples, the attacker’s action space describes the
kind of inputs that the attacker can present to the defender’s model.
The defender’s cost function, for the purpose of the game, is usually some kind
of error rate. Note that this is different from the cost used to train the neural
net, which is designed with other concerns like differentiability in mind. The
cost for the purpose of the game should directly measure the actual performance
of the defender.
Many people often think of adversarial settings as necessarily involving minimax
games, but that is not always the case. In a minimax game, the attacker’s
cost is just the negative cost of the defender. Other cost functions for the
attacker often make sense. For example, the defender may want to get as many
examples correct as possible while the attacker may gain an advantage only from
causing specific mistakes. An untargeted attacker just wants to cause mistakes,
but a targeted attacker wants to cause an input to be recognized as coming
from a specific class. For example, to sneak into a secure facility by fooling
face recognition, it is not enough for the attacker to fool the face recognition
system into guessing their identity incorrectly. The attacker must be recognized
specifically as an individual who has access to the facility.
9
(Goodfellow 2018)
Fifty Shades of Gray Box 
Attacks
• Does the attacker go first, and the defender reacts? 
• This is easy, just train on the attacks, or design some preprocessing to remove them 
• If the defender goes first 
• Does the attacker have full knowledge? This is “white box” 
• Limited knowledge: “black box” 
• Does the attacker know the task the model is solving (input space, output space, defender cost) ? 
• Does the attacker know the machine learning algorithm being used? 
• Details of the algorithm? (Neural net architecture, etc.) 
• Learned parameters of the model? 
• Can the attacker send “probes” to see how the defender processes different test inputs? 
• Does the attacker observe just the output class? Or also the probabilities?
Figure 9: Another important part of specifying the game is specifying the
amount of access that the attacker has to the model and whether the attacker
or the defender makes the first move in the game. If we believe that the defender
first specifies a machine learning algorithm and then the attacker specifies an
attack algorithm, the defender must provide a defense that can adapt to new
attack algorithms. If the attacker has full access to the model, this is called
a “white box” scenario, while if the attacker has no information about the
model, this is called a “black box scenario”. Note that the white box scenario
implies that the defender moves first. Many papers do not explicitly describe
which player moves first, but by studying the white box scenario they implicitly
study games where the defender moves first. The term “black box” is used
inconsistently in the literature; papers that study “black box” scenarios should
explicitly specify the amount of access they allow, since many of these papers
allowing differing amounts of “gray box” access.
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Cross-model, cross-dataset 
generalization
Figure 10: Of particular concern for security purposes is the fact that adversarial
examples transfer from one model to another, first observed by Szegedy et al
2013. In other words, adversarial examples that fool one model are likely to
fool another. This is the basis for many black box attack strategies. This figure
shows how two logistic regression models trained on two different subsets of the
MNIST 3s and 7s learn similar weights and thus will have similar adversarial
examples.
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Cross-technique transferability
(Papernot 2016)
Figure 11: Adversarial examples often transfer between entirely different kinds
of machine learning algorithms, such as SVMs and Decision Trees.
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Train your 
own model
Transfer Attack
Target model with 
unknown weights, 
machine learning 
algorithm, training 
set; maybe non-
differentiable
Substitute model 
mimicking target 
model with known, 
differentiable function
Adversarial 
examples
Adversarial crafting 
against substitute
Deploy adversarial 
examples against the 
target; transferability 
property results in them 
succeeding
Figure 12: A major class of black-box attacks is based on exploiting transfer
between models. The attacker constructs their own model, either by training
their own model on their own training set, or (in threat models that allow this)
by sending inputs to the target model and training their own model to mimic
its outputs. Adversarial examples for the attackers model then transfer to the
target model.
When the attacker trains their own model on their own data, the attacker relies
somewhat on luck for the adversarial examples to transfer to the target, because
the transfer rate is not perfect. When the attacker trains their model to mimic
the target model, as done by Papernot et al 2016, the transfer rate improves
as the substitute model learns the decision boundary of the target model more
accurately, so the attacker is able to actually invest effort and resources to boost
the success rate of the attack.
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Enhancing Transfer With 
Ensembles
(Liu et al, 2016)
Figure 13: Attackers operating in the purely black box setting who cannot send
inputs to the target model in order to reverse-engineer it can boost their chances
of success by finding adversarial examples that fool an entire ensemble of models
trained by the attacker. In this experiment, adversarial examples that fooled
five substitute models had a 100% chance of fooling the target model.
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Norm Balls: A Toy Game
• How to benchmark performance on points that are not in the dataset and not 
labeled? 
• Propagate labels from nearby labeled examples 
• Attacker action: 
• Given a clean example, add a norm-constrained perturbation to it 
• The drosophila of adversarial machine learning 
• Interesting for basic research purposes because of its clarity and difficulty 
• Not relevant for most practical purposes: not a current, applied security problem 
• In my view, this shouldn’t be primarily about human perception
Figure 14: Most adversarial example research today is based on a specific toy
game in the context of visual object recognition.
We want to evaluate the performance of a classifier on arbitrary inputs, since in
most scenarios the attacker is not constrained to supply naturally occurring data
is input. Unfortunately, for visual object recognition, it is not straightforward
to evaluate the classifier on arbitrary inputs. We rely on human labelers to
obtain ground truth labels, and it is slow and expensive to include a human in
the loop to label all attack images.
To obtain an inexpensive and automated evaluation, we can propagate labels
from nearby points ( https://arxiv.org/abs/1412.6572 ). This suggests that for
research purposes, a convenient game to study is one where the attacker’s action
space is to take a clean test image and modify it by adding a norm-constrained
perturbation. The size epsilon of this perturbation is chosen to ensure that
the resulting adversarial examples have the same class as the clean examples.
Epsilon should be made as large as possible while still preserving classes in order
to benchmark performance on as large a subset of the input space as possible.
These games have gained a lot of attention because, despite their simplicity, it
has been extremely difficult for a defender to win such a game.
However, it is important to emphasize that these games are primarily tools for
basic research, and not models of real-world security scenarios. One of the best
things that one could do for adversarial machine learning research is to devise
a practical means of benchmarking performance in more realistic scenarios.
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Who goes first?
• Attacker goes first: 
• Defender trains on the attacks. Usually the defender wins. 
• Not much more interesting than standard dataset 
augmentation 
• Defender goes first: 
• Attacker is adaptive / reactive 
• Extremely difficult. Main reason this topic is unsolved.
Figure 15: An example of where the person trying to fool the neural net goes
first is text CAPTCHAs. Text-based CAPTCHAs have been broken since 2013.
https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/research.google.com/en//pubs/archive/42241.pdf
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Figure 16: In some cases, defenses against adversarial examples act
as a regularizer and actually improve accuracy on the test set (
https://arxiv.org/abs/1412.6572 ). p p In most of the recent literature, the
strongest defenses against adversarial examples tend to decrease accuracy on
the clean test set. To choose a specific model to use on a particular task, we
shoul p pd consider the cost it will incur when it is actually used in practice.
To simplify the discussion, assume all errors are equally costly. If we believe
a model will always receive adversarial examples, we should choose the model
with the highest accuracy in the adversarial setting. If we believe it will receive
only clean examples, then we should choose the model with the highest accuracy
on the clean test set. In many settings, we probably expect the model to come
under attack a certain percentage of the time. If we assume that this percentage
is independent of the choice of model (in reality, models with greater vulnera-
bility may be attacked more often) we should choose the model that performs
the best on a test set consisting of this proportion of adversarial examples. For
example, this plot shows the accuracy of an undefended baseline and two de-
fenses, M-PGD and ALP ( https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.06373 ) on the ImageNet
test set. The ALP model is more robust to adversarial examples, but at the cost
of accuracy on the clean test set. For the ALP model to be preferable to the
baseline, we need to expect that the model will face adversarial examples about
7.1% of the time on the test set. Another interesting thing we see from this plot
is that it shows us some tradeoffs are just not worth it: M-PGD might look like
it offers complementary advantages and disadvantages relative to ALP because
it has higher accuracy on the clean test set, but there is actually never any
point on the curve where M-PGD has the highest accuracy. We can optimally
navigate the tradeoff with only ALP and the undefended baseline as our two
choices. The choice between these two models is complicated by the fact that
accuracies in the adversarial setting are usually upper bounds, based on testing
the defense against a particular attack algorithm. A smarter attack algorithm
or an attack using a different threat model could bring the accuracy of either
model even lower in the adversarial setting, so there is uncertainty about the
true tradeoff. Of course, for the purposes of basic research, it still makes sense
to study how to obtain better accuracy in the completely adversarial setting,
but we must not lose sight of the need to retain good performance on clean
data.
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Gradient Masking
• Some defenses look like they work because they break 
gradient-based white box attacks 
• But then they don’t break black box attacks (e.g., 
adversarial examples made for other models) 
• The defense denies the attacker access to a useful 
gradient but does not actually make the decision 
boundary secure 
• This is called gradient masking
Figure 17: For further reading: https://arxiv.org/abs/1602.02697
https://arxiv.org/abs/1705.07204 https://arxiv.org/abs/1802.00420
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Why not to use L2 
Experiments excluding MNIST 1s, many of which look like 7s
DiffPair
Nearest L0
Nearest L1
Nearest L2
Nearest L∞
Clipped Random 
uniform
L0 L1 L2 L∞
63
91
110
121
784
35.0
19.9
21.7
34.0
116.0
4.86
3.21
2.83
.76
.3
3.82
4.8
1.0
.996
1.0
Figure 18: To propagate labels from points in the dataset with known labels to
nearby off-dataset points with unknown labels, we need some way to measure
distance. In most current work on adversarial examples, this is done with the
L∞ norm, advocated by https://arxiv.org/abs/1412.6572
This is intended to be a way of guaranteeing that the label is known on new test
points. Ideally we would like to propagate labels to as large a volume of space as
possible. (A common misconception is that we want to keep the perturbations
small, to be imperceptible—actually we would like to benchmark on all of Rn if
we had a way of labeling it)
Norms are convenient to implement and to study mathematically, but some
norms are better than others for propagating labels. This is of course highly
application-specific. The L∞ norm is relevant primarily for visual object recog-
nition tasks. For other tasks like malware detection, we would be interested in
transformations of code that preserve its function.
In this example, we see that if we want to add large uniform noise (within the
confines of the unit hypercube), the L∞ norm is the best at assigning larger
distances to noisy perturbations than to perturbations that change the class.
L0, L1, and L2 all assign smaller distances to examples that lie in different
classes than to noisy versions of the example shown. The L∞ does not do this.
We also see that if we constraint the input using the L∞ norm, we can get
relatively large perturbations in terms of the other norms. Our L∞-constrained
uniform perturbation has an L2 norm larger than most of the class-changing
perturbations shown here. Intuitively, restricting the perturbation using the
L∞ makes sure that the adversary cannot focus the whole perturbation on a
small number of pixels, to completely erase or completely draw in ink that
changes the MNIST digit.
The example of uniform noise makes L0, L1, and L2 all look bad, but L0 and L1
can perform better in other examples. It is mostly L2 that I intend to discourage
here.
It would be great if researchers could find an improved method of reliably prop-
agating labels to more points in space than this norm-ball approach allows. It
is important to remember that the goal to an improved evaluation should either
be to label more points or to more realistically model an actual security threat.
In particular, the goal is not to find a good model of human perceptual distance,
unless that helps with either of the preceding goals.
19
(Goodfellow 2018)
Real Attacks Will not be in the 
Norm Ball
(Eykholt et al, 2017)
Figure 19: The norm ball is a nice way of formalizing games for basic research
purposes. We must remember though that the norm ball is not the real game.
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Pipeline of Defense Failures
No effect on advx
Reduces advx, but reduces clean accuracy too much
Does not affect adaptive attacker
Does not generalize over attack algos
Seems to generalize, but it’s an illusion
Does not generalize over threat models
Figure 20:
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Pipeline of Defense Failures
No effect on advx
Reduces advx, but reduces clean accuracy too much
Does not affect adaptive attacker
Does not generalize over attack algos
Seems to generalize, but it’s an illusion
Does not generalize over threat models
Dropout at Train Time
Figure 21: Many of the networks tested in early work on adversar-
ial examples were trained with dropoout: https://arxiv.org/abs/1312.6199
https://arxiv.org/abs/1412.6572
Dropout is a good regularizer, but does not seem to offer any adversarial ro-
bustness.
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Pipeline of Defense Failures
No effect on advx
Reduces advx, but reduces clean accuracy too much
Does not affect adaptive attacker
Does not generalize over attack algos
Seems to generalize, but it’s an illusion
Does not generalize over threat models
Weight Decay
Figure 22: Early work on adversarial examples explored the effect of
both L1 and squared L2 weight decay: https://arxiv.org/abs/1312.6199
https://arxiv.org/abs/1412.6572
For large enough weight decay coefficients weight decay does eventually make the
weights small enough that the model becomes robust to adversarial examples,
but it also makes the accuracy on clean data become relatively bad. Such claims
are of course problem-dependent.
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Pipeline of Defense Failures
No effect on advx
Reduces advx, but reduces clean accuracy too much
Does not affect adaptive attacker
Does not generalize over attack algos
Seems to generalize, but it’s an illusion
Does not generalize over threat models
Cropping / fovea  mechanisms
Figure 23: Cropping and fovea mechanisms have been repeatedly proposed as
defenses. Generating adversarial examples and then cropping them sometimes
reduces error rate. The latest evaluations show that an attacker aware of the
mechanism can defeat it. https://arxiv.org/pdf/1802.00420.pdf
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Pipeline of Defense Failures
No effect on advx
Reduces advx, but reduces clean accuracy too much
Does not affect adaptive attacker
Does not generalize over attack algos
Seems to generalize, but it’s an illusion
Does not generalize over threat models
Adversarial Training with a Weak Attack
Figure 24: One of the first successes in the defense literature was adversar-
ial training, approximating the minimax optimization using a fast approxima-
tion for the adversarial example construction process to generate adversarial
examples on the fly in the inner loop of training. This resulted in a model
that was robust to adversarial examples made using the same attack algorithm
but could be broken by other attack algorithms that used more computation.
https://arxiv.org/abs/1412.6572
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Pipeline of Defense Failures
No effect on advx
Reduces advx, but reduces clean accuracy too much
Does not affect adaptive attacker
Does not generalize over attack algos
Seems to generalize, but it’s an illusion
Does not generalize over threat models
Defensive Distillation
Figure 25: Many defense algorithms seem to perform well against multiple
adaptive attack algorithms, but then are later broken. This usually means that
their apparent success was an illusion, for example due to gradient masking. In
many cases, such broken defenses are still useful contributions to the literature,
because they help to develop the stronger attacks that are used to reveal the
illusion.
https://arxiv.org/abs/1511.04508 https://arxiv.org/abs/1607.04311
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Pipeline of Defense Failures
No effect on advx
Reduces advx, but reduces clean accuracy too much
Does not affect adaptive attacker
Does not generalize over attack algos
Seems to generalize, but it’s an illusion
Does not generalize over threat models
Adversarial Training with a Strong Attack
Current Certified / Provable Defenses
Figure 26: The current state of the art defense (
https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.06373 ) is based on using a strong at-
tack ( https://arxiv.org/abs/1706.06083 ) for adversarial training (
https://arxiv.org/abs/1412.6572 https://arxiv.org/abs/1611.01236 ).
On MNIST in particular, Madry et al’s model is regarded as highly robust, after
being subject to public scrutiny for several months.
However, this robustness holds only within the L∞ ball. It is possible to break
this model by switching to a different threat model, even one that seems con-
ceptually similar, such as the L1 ball: https://arxiv.org/abs/1709.04114
This problem even applies to all existing certified defenses, because the certifi-
cates are specific to a particular norm ball: https://arxiv.org/abs/1801.09344
https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.06567 https://arxiv.org/abs/1711.00851
A late-breaking result is that GAN-based models can also produce adversarial
examples that appear unperturbed to a human observer but break these models:
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1805.07894.pdf
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Adversarial Logit Pairing (ALP)
clean 
logits
adv 
logits
Adversarial perturbation
Logit pairing
First approach 
to achieve >50% 
top-5 accuracy 
against iterative 
adversarial examples 
on ImageNet
Current state 
of the art
(Kannan et al 2018)
Figure 27: For more information, see https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.06373
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Timeline of Defenses Against 
Adversarial Examples
Szegedy et al 2013: train on adversarial examples
Goodfellow et al 2014: generate them constantly 
in the inner loop of training (minimax)
Kurakin et al 2016: use an iterative attack
Madry et al 2017: randomize the starting 
point of the attack. 1st to generalize over 
attack algorithms
Kannan et al 2018: logit pairing
Pre-2013: 
Defenses for 
convex models
Figure 28: 2013: https://arxiv.org/abs/1312.6199 2014:
https://arxiv.org/abs/1412.6572 2016: https://arxiv.org/abs/1611.01236 2017:
https://arxiv.org/abs/1706.06083 2018: https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.06373
( There has also been earlier work on securing convex models, which is very
different from securing neural nets, e.g.: https://homes.cs.washington.edu/ pe-
drod/papers/kdd04.pdf https://cs.nyu.edu/ roweis/papers/robust icml06.pdf )
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Disappointing outcome of toy game
• My hope: something simple (Bayesian deep nets?) 
will solve the adversarial example problem, do well 
on the points we can measure via norm ball label 
propagation, also do well on points that are hard to 
measure 
• Outcome so far: best results are obtained by 
directly optimizing the performance measure. Both 
for empirical and for certified approaches. Defenses 
do not generalize out of the norm ball.
Figure 29:
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Future Directions: Indirect 
Methods
• Do not just optimize the performance measure exactly 
• Best methods so far: 
• Logit pairing (non-adversarial) 
• Label smoothing 
• Logit squeezing 
• Can we perform a lot better with other methods that are 
similarly indirect?
Figure 30: https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=F4c3DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA311&dq=info:J1EtPob5tcoJ:scholar.google.com&ots=idBTNGuyP8&sig=HMrjcmrn fs2-
kyaAo-XNr1Expo#v=onepage&q&f=false observed that label smoothing helps
resist adversarial examples.
https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.06373 observed that a few non-adversarial methods
of regularizing the logits of a model help it to resist adversarial examples.
So far, these are the only methods of resisting adversarial examples I know of
that are not based on directly optimizing some definition of adversarial error
rate. I think an important research direction is to find other methods that are
similarly indirect and yet perform well. These methods seem most likely to gen-
eralize beyond a specific attack model, because they do not involve optimizing
directly for performance under that specific attack.
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Future Directions: Better 
Attack Models
• Add new attack models other than norm balls 
• Study messy real problems in addition to clean toy 
problems 
• Study certification methods that use other proof 
strategies besides local smoothness 
• Study more problems other than vision
Figure 31:
(Goodfellow 2018)
Future Directions: Security Independent 
from Traditional Supervised Learning
• Until recently, both adversarial example research and traditional 
supervised learning seemed fully aligned: just make the model better 
• They still share this goal 
• It is now clear security research must have some independent goals. 
For two models with the same error volume, for reasons of security we 
prefer: 
• The model with lower confidence on mistakes 
• The model whose mistakes are harder to find 
• A stochastic model that does not repeatedly make the same 
mistake on the same input 
• A model whose mistakes are less valuable to the attacker / costly 
to the defender 
• A model that is harder to reverse engineer with probes 
• A model that is less prone to transfer from related models
Figure 32:
32
(Goodfellow 2018)
Some Non-Security Reasons to 
Study Adversarial Examples
Gamaleldin et al 2018
Understand Human Perception 
Improve Supervised Learning 
(Goodfellow et al 2014)
Improve Semi-Supervised 
Learning 
(Miyato et al 2015)
(Oliver+Odena+Raffel et al, 
2018)
Figure 33: My recommendations today have mostly focused on how to make
machine learning secure.
This is distinct from the question of what research should be done regarding
adversarial examples.
Studying adversarial examples has improved supervised learning temporarily
in the past ( https://arxiv.org/abs/1412.6572 ) and may make a more last-
ing improvement to supervised learning in the future. Studying adversar-
ial examples has certainly made a significant contribution to semi-supervised
learning: virtual adversarial training ( https://arxiv.org/abs/1507.00677 )
was the best performing method in a recent exhaustive benchmark (
https://arxiv.org/abs/1804.09170 ).
Studying adversarial examples may also help to understand the human brain (
https://arxiv.org/abs/1802.08195 ).
Besides these applications, many other applications such as model-based opti-
mization seem possible.
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Clever Hans
(“Clever Hans, 
Clever 
Algorithms,” 
Bob Sturm)
Figure 34: Many adversarial example researchers draw inspiration from the
story of Clever Hans, a horse who was taught to do arithmetic. Clever Hans
appeared able to successfully answer arithmetic questions, but had actually
instead learned to read the questioner’s body language to infer the answer.
Adversarial examples are similar; they show that our algorithms have learned
to apparently succeed at complex tasks, but the algorithms often get the right
answer for the wrong reason. Studying adversarial examples can help us learn
to make algorithms that actually understand the tasks we assign them to do.
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Get involved!
https://github.com/tensorflow/cleverhans
Figure 35: If you would like to get involved in defenses against adversarial
examples, check out the CleverHans library providing reference implementations
of many of the strongest attacks. By benchmarking with this library, you can
be sure that your model is robust to the best known attacks.
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